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 Private Ordering and Commercial 
Arbitration: 
Lasting Lessons from Mentschikoff 
Stephen J. Ware* 
ABSTRACT: 
“Private ordering” is an important concept and commonly-used 
phrase in legal scholarship. At least three “ordering” activities often 
performed by governments can be privatized: lawmaking, adjudication, 
and enforcement of adjudicators’ decisions. Distinguishing among these 
activities and offering lasting lessons on their privatization—but nowadays 
not often credited for doing so—is Soia Mentschikoff’s seminal 1961 
article, Commercial Arbitration. This short piece reconsiders 
Mentschikoff’s classic article in light of contemporary scholarship on 
private ordering and credits Commercial Arbitration with teaching us 
lasting lessons about commercial arbitration and even about commerce 
itself. Key to these lessons is Mentschikoff’s empirical study of trade 
association arbitration and her comparison of such industry-specific 
arbitration with the more general commercial arbitration exemplified by 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA). This comparison shows 
arbitration’s ability—especially in the “core commercial” context of trade 
associations—to privatize all three of the aforementioned “ordering” 
activities: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of adjudicators’ 
decisions. Mentschikoff thus builds impressively from the humble context 
of routine sales disputes to enduring insights about the role of private 
ordering in the production, application, and enforcement of law. 
 
PRIVATE ORDERING AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LASTING LESSONS 
FROM MENTSCHIKOFF 
I.  Private Ordering  
A. Privatizing Lawmaking, Adjudication, and Enforcement  
B. Levels of Government Support for Private Ordering  
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II.  Mentschikoff’s Commercial Arbitration 
A. Mentschikoff’s Data 
B. A Classic Article’s Enduring Relevance  
C. Goods, Cross-Border Transactions, and Arbitration   
III.  Private Ordering in Commercial Arbitration 
IV. Conclusion 
 
“Private ordering” is an important concept and commonly-used phrase in legal 
scholarship.1  While in this context “private” generally means non-governmental, 
the type and degree of non-governmental ordering can vary widely.2  For example, 
different scholars have used “private ordering” to refer to things as varied as 
contracts,3 neighborly customs among California ranchers,4 credit rating agencies,5 
                                                          
 1. A Feb. 14, 2018, search of “private ordering” in Westlaw’s JLR database revealed 6607 results. 
5035 of these are dated 2000 or later, while only 1572 are before 2000. 
 2. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, Path Dependence in the Development of Private Ordering, 2014 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 29, 30 (2014) (using “private ordering” and “Private legal systems (PLSs)” interchangeably 
and noting “PLSs range from informal institutions that bear little resemblance to the public legal system 
(the law), such as norms of politeness, to ones that are very similar to the law, such as complex 
commercial arbitration among diamond dealers.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, New Frontiers in Private Ordering-An Introduction, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 
577, 577 (2007) (“Contract law itself is a mixture of the public and the private, a means by which the 
state supports private ordering with remedies for breach of some promises.”); Howell E. Jackson, 
Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploration Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
319, 341–43 (1999) (“Private ordering is, of course, our presumptive (but not exclusive) regulatory 
regime in the field of contracts. In the classic two-party contract setting, we generally allow parties to 
allocate risks as they choose.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 
163–67 (2013) (“the private ordering analyzed by Ostrom, Ellickson, and others . . . tends to occur 
through informal interactions among individuals . . . [such as] the norms that drive the behavior of 
lobstermen in Maine or farmers and cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California”); Barak D. Richman, 
Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 746 (2012) (citing Robert C. 
Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 3-4 (1991) (“Shasta County Neighbors, 
it turns out, do not behave as Coase portrays them as behaving in the Farmer-Rancher Parable. Neighbors 
in fact are strongly inclined to cooperate, but they achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from 
legally established entitlements, as the parable supposes, but rather by developing and enforcing adaptive 
norms of neighborliness that trump formal legal entitlements.”)). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase 
and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986) 
(studying effects of a 1945 statute granting County Board of Supervisors authority to determine when 
cattle owners were liable for cattle trespass. Through interviewing 28 ranchers in 1982, Ellickson 
determined that the 1945 change in animal trespass law failed to affect the farmers’ resource allocation 
towards improving boundary fences because high transaction costs, namely having to learn and enforce 
legal rules, prevented litigation. Even though cattle trespass was common, cattle owners chose not to 
rely on law, but instead on “norms of neighborliness” to settle disputes.); id. at 678 (“Although the killing 
of trespassing livestock is a crime in California, six landowners--not noticeably less civilized than the 
others--unhesitatingly volunteered that they had issued death threats of this sort. These threats are 
credible in Shasta County, because victims of recurring trespasses, particularly if they have first issued 
a warning, feel justified in killing or injuring the mischievous animals.”). 
 5. Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Private and Public Ordering in Safe Asset Markets, 10 BROOK. 
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 97, 104 (2015). 
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Underwriters Laboratories,6 the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations,7 and the Mafia.8 
More conceptually, at least three “ordering” activities often performed by 
governments can be privatized: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of 
adjudicators’ decisions. Distinguishing among these activities and offering lasting 
lessons on their privatization—but nowadays not often credited for doing so—is 
Soia Mentschikoff’s seminal 1961 article, Commercial Arbitration.9  This short 
piece reconsiders Mentschikoff’s classic article in light of contemporary 
scholarship on private ordering, and credits Commercial Arbitration with teaching 
us lasting lessons about commercial arbitration and even about commerce itself. 
Key to these lessons is Mentschikoff’s empirical study of trade association 
arbitration and her comparison of such industry-specific arbitration, with the more 
general commercial arbitration exemplified by the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA). This comparison shows arbitration’s ability—especially in the 
“core commercial” context of trade associations—to privatize all three of the 
aforementioned “ordering” activities: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of 
adjudicators’ decisions. Mentschikoff thus builds impressively from the humble 
context of routine sales disputes to enduring insights about the role of private 
ordering in the production, application, and enforcement of law. 
I. PRIVATE ORDERING 
A. Privatizing Lawmaking, Adjudication, and Enforcement 
Governments make law, and “[a]lmost all theorizing about law begins with 
government.”10  A simple civics lesson might describe the roles of the three 
branches of government as making law (legislature), enforcing law (executive), and 
                                                          
 6. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 321-22 (2002). 
 7. Id. See also About The Joint Commission, THE JOINT COMM’N, https://www.jointcommission
.org/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx (last updated Oct. 23, 2018) (commission 
provides accreditation and certification to health care organizations that meet certain performance 
standards). 
 8. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2457–58 (2000) (“Some private-order organizations use threats of physical 
violence. The Sicilian and Russian Mafias, for example, offer contract-supporting services, but a lot else 
besides. Organized crime, according to Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, ‘is the dark side of private 
ordering - an entrepreneurial response to inefficiencies in the property rights and enforcement framework 
supplied by the state.’”) (quoting Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private 
Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43 
(2000)); Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of 
Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2335–36 (2004) (describing as a “system[] of private 
enforcement” “aris[ing] where . . . state-sponsored contract enforcement is unavailable” “members of 
mafia or other criminal networks whose transactions involve illegal activity”). 
 9. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961). 
 10. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Privatizing Law: Is Rule of Law an 
Equilibrium Without Private Ordering?, SSRN (Oct. 23, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057093 
(“Almost all theorizing about law begins with government.” The conventional view is that “law is the 
subset of norms that are created and enforced by governments. Positive political theory takes the idea 
that law is the province of government for granted and focuses on the processes and principles by which 
the substance of law is determined.”). 
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adjudicating disputes by applying law (judicial).11  While no branch of government 
sticks to a single role,12 the three roles of making, enforcing, and adjudicating law 
adequately describe the basics of government. This sequence of governmental 
activity—making, enforcing, adjudicating—is often chronological in criminal 
prosecutions and other cases brought by government because, in such cases, 
lawmaking precedes governmental enforcement (arrest, indictment, or suit), which 
precedes adjudication.13 In contrast, when the plaintiff is a private party, 
government’s adjudication usually precedes its enforcement because in civil 
litigation due process typically entitles the defendant to notice and an opportunity 
to be heard before any governmental enforcement against that defendant.14 
                                                          
 11. See, e.g., VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223, 235 (Kan. 1973) (“Generally speaking, the 
legislative power is the power to make, amend, or repeal laws; the executive power is the power to 
enforce the laws, and the judicial power is the power to interpret and apply the laws in actual 
controversies.”). 
 12. For example, both executive agencies and common law courts make law and legislative “Article 
I courts” adjudicate. 
 13. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3-103 (1975) (“All violations of the criminal laws may . . . be 
prosecuted upon the filing of an information . . . ‘Information’ means a written statement by a district 
attorney general charging a person with the commission of a criminal offense.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
34-1-1 (LexisNexis 1982) (“All prosecutions of crimes shall be brought in the name of the state of 
Indiana. Any crime may be charged by indictment or information . . . Except as provided . . . all 
prosecutions of crimes shall be instituted by the filing of an information or indictment by the prosecuting 
attorney, in a court with jurisdiction over the crime charged.”); Charging, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/charging (last visited Feb. 11, 2018) (“After the prosecutor 
studies the information from investigators and the information he gathers from talking with the 
individuals involved, he decides whether to present the case to the grand jury. When a person is indicted, 
he is given formal notice that it is believed that he committed a crime. The indictment contains the basic 
information that informs the person of the charges against him.”); Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence 
After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2394 (2011) (“Administrative agencies, it is widely remarked, 
possess and combine the powers of lawmaking, enforcement, and adjudication. It would be hard to resist 
(or to improve on) Professor Gary Lawson’s compact statement of how the Federal Trade Commission 
combines these functions: The Commission promulgates substantive rules of conduct. The Commission 
then considers whether to authorize investigations into whether the Commission’s rules have been 
violated. If the Commission authorizes an investigation, the investigation is conducted by the 
Commission, which reports its findings to the Commission. If the Commission thinks the Commission’s 
findings warrant an enforcement action, the Commission issues a complaint. The Commission’s 
complaint that a Commission rule has been violated is then prosecuted by the Commission and 
adjudicated by the Commission. This Commission adjudication can either take place before the full 
Commission or before a semi-autonomous administrative law judge. If the Commission chooses to 
adjudicate before an administrative law judge and the decision is adverse to the Commission, the 
Commission can appeal to the Commission.”). 
 14. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 8 (1991) (“[D]ispensing with notice and opportunity for a 
hearing until after the attachment, without a showing of extraordinary circumstances, violates the 
requirements of due process”); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United 
States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The Government may not deprive a person of one 
of these protected interests without providing ‘notice and an opportunity to respond,’ or, in other words, 
the opportunity to present reasons not to proceed with the deprivation and have them considered.”); 10 
WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, DEBTOR & CREDITOR NON-BANKRUPTCY § 9:2 (4th ed.) (under Supreme Court 
decisions, “the defendant must receive notice of the request for a prejudgment remedy and an 
opportunity for a hearing either before seizure of property or (under certain circumstances) promptly 
thereafter.”); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8 
(2006) (“Briefly stated, the essential element of procedural due process, as clearly established in civil 
settings, is that notice and a hearing must ordinarily precede any governmental deprivation of a liberty 
or property interest.”); Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances Gecker, Due Process and Bankruptcy: A 
Contradiction in Terms?, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 54, 60 (1993) (stating that “[t]he cornerstones of 
procedural due process are ‘notice’ and a ‘hearing.’ . . . As a general rule, individuals are constitutionally 
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Consequently, this paper on private ordering (not government’s prosecutions or 
suits) discusses lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement in that sequence. 
Lawmaking is routinely privatized by contracts, trusts, wills, and similar 
documents that enable private parties to choose their legally-enforceable rights and 
duties.15  But government courts nevertheless adjudicate and enforce those 
privately-created duties, so the “private ordering” of contracts, trusts, wills, and the 
like does not necessarily privatize the activities of adjudicating legal claims or 
enforcing the adjudicators’ decisions.16 
Adjudication can be privatized through arbitration, which typically privatizes 
both selection of the adjudicator (an arbitrator hired by the parties rather than a 
judge hired by government) and the procedures of adjudication (such as the AAA’s 
Commercial Arbitration Rules, rather than the federal or state rules of civil 
procedure and evidence).17  However, while arbitration privatizes adjudication, it 
does not necessarily privatize lawmaking or the enforcement of adjudicators’ 
decisions. That is because the claim in an arbitrated case may arise under law (such 
as a statute or regulation) made entirely by government,18 and the arbitrator’s 
decision may be confirmed by a government court and then enforced by a 
government sheriff or marshal.19 
Private ordering can even extend to law enforcement, which in this context (as 
noted above20) means remedying breaches of duties found in civil, as opposed to 
criminal, law. Examples of private law enforcement are many. For instance, 
breaches of contract are often met with private sanctions like refusing to do 
additional business with the breaching party or lowering a defaulting debtor’s credit 
score or bond rating with a credit bureau or ratings agency.21  In those examples, 
                                                          
entitled to prior notice of a hearing” and “[t]here must be a method whereby one can defend rights or 
interests that another is trying to take away; this concern is satisfied with the opportunity to be heard.”). 
 15. Brian H. Bix, The Public and Private Ordering of Marriage, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 308 
(2004) (“The general argument for making enforceable the private ordering of marriage and marriage-
like relationships reflects the general ideals underlying other forms of private ordering (e.g., contracts, 
trusts, property, and wills): that it better serves both private and public interests to allow parties to order 
their lives as it suits them.”).  
 16. See Aviram, supra note 2 (citing Braucher, supra note 3 and Jackson, supra note 3). 
 17. “[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected 
[disputing] party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned 
arguments for a decision in his favor.” Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. 
L. REV. 353, 364 (1978); see also 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT § 2.6.1, at 2:37 n.1 (1994) (“Arbitration is a form of adjudication because the parties 
participate in the decisional process by presenting evidence and reasoned arguments to an arbitrator 
whose final decision should be responsive to the dispute as presented.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1031, 1038 (2009) (international “arbitrators ordinarily rely on national law and 
not the [privately-created customary] lex mercatoria in resolving disputes”). 
 19. See STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA R. LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW § 39 (2017) 
(discussing confirmation and enforcement of arbitral awards). To the extent government enforces 
arbitration awards that depart from government-created law, then arbitration might well privatize 
lawmaking; but law on when courts should enforce or vacate such awards is deeply unsettled. Stephen 
J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 56, 106 (2014) 
(Supreme Court has yet to “resolve the fundamental question whether arbitration awards must apply the 
law correctly to avoid vacatur”). 
 20. See supra notes 13-14 (and accompanying text). 
 21. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support 
Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 1000 (2016) (surveying businesses 
and finding that “contract breach is penalized by the loss of a valuable relationship or reputational harm” 
5
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while enforcement of the legal duty may be entirely privatized, a government court 
may adjudicate the claim for breach of that duty.22 
B. Levels of Government Support for Private Ordering 
All the private ordering discussed above is to some extent supported by 
government, which enacts laws designed to facilitate: (1) private lawmaking 
through contracts, trusts, and wills;23 (2) private adjudication through arbitration; 24 
and (3) private law enforcement through credit bureaus and ratings agencies.25  In 
contrast, other private ordering is actively opposed by government. For example, 
government actively opposes criminal enterprises such as the Mafia, and such 
enterprises engage in private ordering insofar as they: (1) enact rules of “law,” such 
                                                          
rather than by litigation); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction 
of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1392 
(2010) (“One type of informal enforcement is the threat that one party to an informal contract will 
respond to its counterparty’s breach by reducing or terminating future dealings.”); David Charny, 
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 394-95 (1990) (“often-cited 
data that merchants rarely sued when sales contracts were breached suggest that those contracts were 
primarily enforced through nonlegal sanctions. On this interpretation of the data, the legally enforceable 
contract formally stated the parties’ obligations, but nonlegal pressures - particularly concern with 
business reputation - actually induced compliance.”); id. at n.70 (“[M]anufacturers often extend credit 
to consumers even though high litigation costs and judgment-proof defaulters may make it impractical 
to obtain recovery through legal remedies. The incentive for consumers to repay is largely reputational: 
consumers want to maintain a good credit rating.”); Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 326-27 (describing credit 
ratings agencies, as “private companies, such as Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services and Moody’s 
Investors Service,” as a type of private ordering). 
 22. Braucher, supra note 3, at 577 (“Contract law itself is a mixture of the public and the private, a 
means by which the state supports private ordering with remedies for breach of some promises.”). For 
instance, a lender might sue and win a quick default judgment against its borrower but then incur only 
the low cost of reporting the judgment to credit bureaus but not the higher costs of pursuing government’s 
judgment-enforcement (such as through garnishment or writs to a sheriff). 
 23. See Jackson, supra note 3; Bix, supra note 15, at 304 (“Another sense of private ordering involves 
having the power to order one’s life by being able to enter binding agreements for the future distribution 
of property (for example, through wills). This form of private ordering requires a government (or social 
institution or other social force) willing and able to enforce the commitments entered into.”); David V. 
Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 373–77 (2003) (“[M]ost privately made law depends 
ultimately on the power of the state—power the state lends, dependably and in generous measure . . . 
[and] in various commercial contexts, as a practical matter, the lawmaking function has been partially 
reallocated from the government.”). 
 24. Barak Richman lists as a private ordering activity within the “shadow of the law”: “the growing 
and elaborate world of arbitration.” Richman, supra note 4, at 744–45. 
 25. FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970); Scott Shorr, Personal 
Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1756, 1784-89 (1995) (“FCRA permits credit bureaus and their customers to exchange large 
quantities of detailed consumer information with impunity [and] . . . gives credit bureaus considerable 
freedom to resort to intrusive collection methods.”). 
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as, do not snitch to the police;26 (2) adjudicate alleged violations of these rules;27 
and (3) enforce violations of these rules.28 
In between private ordering supported by government and private ordering 
opposed by government is private ordering which receives neither significant 
government support nor significant government opposition, but rather government 
neutrality. The classic example of such private ordering is trade association 
arbitration. It typically privatizes: 
• lawmaking, because trade association “arbitrators commonly apply 
codified industry trade rules rather than publicly created rules,”29 and these 
trade rules often differ from the government law that would otherwise 
apply;30 
                                                          
 26. Adam Harris Kurland, The Prosecution of Michael Vick: Of Dogfighting, Depravity, Dual 
Sovereignty, and “A Clockwork Orange”, 21 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 465, 513 n.168 (2011) (quoting 
LETIZIA PAOLI, MAFIA BROTHERHOODS: ORGANIZED CRIME, ITALIAN STYLE 109 (2003)) (“‘omerta’ is 
described as popular southern Italian code of silence that implies ‘the categorical prohibition of 
cooperation with state authorities’.”). 
 27. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and Motive to 
Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 258 n.95 (1998) (citing United States 
v. Gotti, 171 F.R.D. 19, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (According to the Mafia’s loyalty oath, “death is assured 
for the person who is or is suspected of becoming a rat.”)). 
 28. Id. See also Richman, supra note 4, at 748 (“the mafia and other criminal networks resort to self-
enforcement because their illegal transactions are unenforceable in state-sponsored courts”). 
 29. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1035–36; see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: 
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1772-73 (1996) 
(National Grain and Feed Association (“NGFA”) has privatized lawmaking by “adopt[ing] four sets of 
substantive trade rules that . . . cover the basics of contract formation, performance, repudiation, breach, 
damages, and excuse” as well as issues related to barge transportation.); Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (“[D]iamond industry disputes are 
resolved not through the courts and not by the application of legal rules announced and enforced by the 
state. The diamond industry has systematically rejected state-created law. In its place, the sophisticated 
traders who dominate the industry have developed an elaborate, internal set of rules, complete with 
distinctive institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes among industry members.”). See Yuliya 
Chernykh, The Last Citadel: The Restricted Role of Lawyers in Soft Commodity Arbitration, 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2017), https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?
key=2453 (soft commodities arbitration, such as that administered by the Grain and Feed Trade 
Association and the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations, “shows that non-legal adjudicators 
with good knowledge of trade usages and customs are preferable to legal adjudicators who are not 
particularly familiar with them. This preference is confirmed by a number of examples, ranging from 
direct confirmation from major traders and the impressive proportion of trade that is conducted under 
the associations’ standard contract forms to such indirect illustrations as the growing numbers of trade 
association members; the numerous amendments to arbitration rules and other regulations, guidelines 
and policy which have not excluded the qualification requirements for arbitrators; a constant preference 
for not listing arbitrators who are actively involved in legal practice, and the lack of other fora competing 
with bespoke commodity arbitration, etc.”). 
 30. For instance, Bernstein notes that “industry-drafted trade rules do not, for the most part, include 
the types of standard-like words, such as ‘reasonable,’ ‘seasonable,’ and ‘without objection in the trade,’ 
that permeate the [Uniform Commercial] Code. Rather, they contain primarily clear, bright-line rules.” 
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 29, at 1732-33. “Another notable 
difference between the trade rules and the Code is the absence of a trade rule equivalent of the Code’s 
nonwaivable duty of good faith.” Id. at 1734; see also Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, 
supra note 29, at 1775 (National Grain and Feed Association “trade rules do not contain an explicit 
equivalent of the Code’s broad duty of good faith.”). In addition, “the types of damage measures 
available in the private system differ in important ways from the measures used in the public system.” 
Bernstein, Private Commerical Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 29, at 1733. 
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• adjudication, because in trade association arbitration “the decision maker 
is a private party, not a state employee,”31 and 
• enforcement, because trade association “arbitration awards are typically 
enforced through extralegal sanctions, such as publicity or threat of 
expulsion from the trade association. Only rarely do parties go to court to 
enforce awards in trade association arbitrations.”32 
Soia Mentschikoff, as explained below, showed all this with the publication of 
Commercial Arbitration in 1961.33  Trade association arbitration then apparently 
faded from the interest of legal scholars until the 1990’s and 2000’s, when Lisa 
Bernstein published a series of detailed and widely-cited studies of trade association 
arbitration.34  Academic interest in “private ordering” more generally seems also to 
have increased in recent decades.35 
Some of this recent literature contrasts trade association arbitration with other 
arbitration to compare different types of private ordering.36  For instance, 
Christopher Drahozal persuasively contrasts trade association arbitration—which 
often privatizes all three of lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of law—with 
international commercial arbitration, which privatizes only adjudication because 
international commercial arbitration tends to apply national law, rather than 
privately-created rules,37 and because its awards are often enforced by national 
courts rather than privately.38 So, Drahozal writes, international commercial 
arbitration is not “a purely private legal system,”39 but rather a “hybrid case” serving 
primarily as a “procedural substitute for national courts.”40  Similarly, Barak 
Richman emphasizes that trade association arbitration, exemplifying “private legal 
systems rely[ing] on private sanctions and private enforcement,” is very different 
from other arbitration, which “takes place within the shadow of the law” because 
its awards are enforced by government.41 
                                                          
 31. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1035. See also Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra 
note 29, at 1772 (NGFA has privatized adjudication because “[a]s a condition of membership in the 
Association, members must agree to submit all disputes with other members to the Association’s 
arbitration system.”). 
 32. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1036. See also Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra 
note 29, at 1772 (NGFA has privatized enforcement of adjudicator’s decisions because “[a] member who 
refuses to submit to arbitration or fails to comply with an arbitration award rendered against him may, 
in addition to having his actions reported in the NGFA newsletter, be suspended or expelled from the 
Association.”). 
 33. See infra Section II. 
 34. See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 29. THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Lisa Bernstein, 
The NGFA Arbitration System at Work (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.ngfa.org/pdfs/NGFA
ARBITRATIONSTUDY.pdf; Richman, supra note 4, at 741 (“Among the most important strands of 
scholarship on extralegal enforcement have been inquiries, most famously by Professor Lisa Bernstein, 
into comprehensive private arbitration systems, or private legal systems.”). 
 35. See supra note 1. 
 36. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1032–33; Richman, supra note 4, at 753–57. 
 37. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1038–40. 
 38. Id. at 1035-36. 
 39. Id. at 1049. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Richman, supra note 4, at 757; id. at 759–60 (“Private legal systems, however, are distinct from 
typical arbitration precisely because they rest atop private enforcement mechanisms--and, in fact, they 
tend to prohibit their members from seeking relief from state-sponsored courts, as victors in arbitration 
are able to do.”). 
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These contemporary scholars—Bernstein, Drahozal, and Richman—follow 
and deepen Mentschikoff’s path, as she long ago published a detailed study of trade 
association arbitration and contrasted such arbitration with other arbitration, thus 
illuminating different types of private ordering. 
II. MENTSCHIKOFF’S COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
A. Mentschikoff’s Data 
The previous section summarized some significant contemporary legal 
scholarship on private ordering. While that literature grows increasingly 
sophisticated, many of its important lessons appeared in Mentschikoff’s 1961 article 
Commercial Arbitration. The following pages reconsider this classic article and 
show how very much Mentschikoff taught us. 
Commercial Arbitration is an empirical article, as it reports the results of 
Mentschikoff’s survey of trade associations. While Commercial Arbitration does 
not tout this survey, in fact first mentioning it as a passing reference while 
discussing something else,42 this survey provides the basis for the article’s many 
important contributions. 
Mentschikoff’s survey of these trade associations “received 547 relevant 
responses.”43  At the broadest level, 34% of the associations “indicated that their 
members made individual arrangements for arbitration,” while 29% “indicated that 
they used some type of organized machinery, including the American Arbitration 
Association,” and 26% “reported that their members never arbitrate.”44  
Mentschikoff’s analysis of this data yields Commercial Arbitration’s key insight: 
“These differential responses from trade associations as to the utilization of 
arbitration was not on a random basis, but indicated instead that there were rational 
reasons for the existence of these differences.”45 Mentschikoff’s empirical data on 
the prevalence of arbitration distinguishes among the types of goods involved; and 
she classifies parties according to their roles in the production and distribution of 
goods, with particular emphasis on “merchants,” which she defines as “persons 
primarily buying for resale.”46 Mentschikoff made three findings: 
(1) Where members of a trade association buy primarily for resale, the rate of 
institutionalized arbitration machinery is higher than in associations without these 
types of merchants.47 
(2) Associations dealing in foreign trade, especially importers, were more 
likely to use an institutionalized arbitration system.48 
                                                          
 42. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 846. Nine years earlier, Mentschikoff published an article stating 
an intent to generate empirical data on arbitration. See Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of 
Arbitration—A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 699 (1952) (“The University of 
Chicago Law School is now considering a project which would at least by sample tend to give the 
answers, but that cannot be completed for at least three years.”). 
 43. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 849. 
 44. Id. at 849. 
 45. Id. at 849-50. 
 46. Id. at 850. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 850-51. 
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(3) Raw/fungible goods associations are more likely to develop an 
institutionalized arbitration system than hard/finished goods like cars or 
appliances.49 
Mentschikoff further adds that when all three factors—merchants (buy for 
resale), international trade, and raw goods—are present the rate of institutionalized 
arbitration approaches 100%.50   Implications of these findings are discussed in the 
following sections. 
B. A Classic Article’s Enduring Relevance 
Mentschikoff’s survey teaches us lasting lessons about commercial arbitration, 
and even about commerce itself. Among these lessons are connections between 
goods and commerce, and thus between goods and commercial arbitration. For 
example, as Christopher Drahozal and I wrote (citing Commercial Arbitration), 
“Going back to Soia Mentschikoff’s pioneering research, the commercial 
arbitration literature has focused on sales of goods as the leading place to find 
arbitration clauses between businesses.”51  Drahozal and I wrote this while 
cautioning against reading data collected by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey 
Miller to suggest that “given their choice, most businesses that negotiate contracts 
would prefer a judicial dispute resolution system over arbitration.”52  While 
Eisenberg and Miller saw a “surprisingly low frequency of arbitration clauses” in 
the contracts they studied,53 Drahozal and I drew on Mentschikoff’s Commercial 
Arbitration to write: 
Not only do Eisenberg and Miller focus on types of contracts that are 
unlikely to include arbitration clauses, they either do not consider, or pay 
little heed to, the types of contracts that the arbitration literature commonly 
identifies as likely to include arbitration clauses. As a result, their study 
likely significantly understates the use of arbitration clauses in contracts 
between sophisticated parties. 
First, going back to Soia Mentschikoff’s pioneering research, the 
commercial arbitration literature has focused on sales of goods as the 
                                                          
 49. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 851-52. 
 50. Id. at 852 (“To the extent that the factors leading to institutionalized machinery reinforce each 
other, as, for example, in the case of an association reporting that its members have an import relationship 
to foreign trade, deal in raws, and consist of merchants, the existence of arbitration machinery rises to 
approximately 100 per cent.”). 
 51. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration 
Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 463 (2010). 
 52. Id. at 434 (quoting William J. Woodward Jr., Saving the Hague Choice of Court Convention, 29 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 657, 669 (2008)). 
 53. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 51, at 434 (quoting Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The 
Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly 
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (2007)). Eisenberg and Miller concluded: “Little 
evidence was found to support the proposition that these [sophisticated] parties routinely regard 
arbitration clauses as efficient or otherwise desirable contract terms.” Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey 
Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts 
of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (2007). Instead, they “interpret [their] 
findings as evidence that sophisticated actors prefer litigation to arbitration, encounter obstacles to 
negotiating mutually satisfactory contract terms that include arbitration clauses, or some combination of 
these factors.” Id. at 336. 
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leading place to find arbitration clauses between businesses. This focus on 
goods continues in Lisa Bernstein’s widely-cited studies of trade 
association arbitration. Bernstein documents the prevalence of arbitration 
in contracts for the sale of goods in industries as diverse as cotton, 
diamonds, grain, and textiles. Moreover, sale-of-goods disputes rank 
highly in the caseloads of international arbitration institutions. Yet none of 
these goods contracts is, as far we can tell, in Eisenberg and Miller’s data 
set.54 
In short, sale-of-goods disputes have long been the core of “commercial 
arbitration,” and one of Commercial Arbitration’s strengths is its emphasis on 
goods, as distinguished from land, services, credit, intellectual property, or 
information. An important connection between goods and arbitration—cross-border 
transactions—is discussed next. 
C. Goods, Cross-Border Transactions, and Arbitration 
While the word “commercial” is sometimes used to describe any activity with 
a business or income-producing purpose (as distinguished from a personal, family, 
household, religious, cultural, social, political, or governmental purpose),55 
transactions in goods differ from other business transactions because goods, as 
tangible movables, differ from both land—which is tangible, but immoveable—and 
intangibles like services, credit, intellectual property, and information. Such 
differences cause transactions in goods to raise legal issues not raised by other 
business transactions.56  For example, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2—which 
                                                          
 54. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 51, at 463-64. 
 55. For example, the phrase “commercial real estate” is widely used in contrast to “residential real 
estate.” See, e.g., DAVID GELTNERER & NORM G. MILLER, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS AND 
INVESTMENTS (2d. ed. 2007) (“Mortgagebacked securities (MBS) are publicly traded bondlike products 
that are based on underlying pools of mortgages, which are real-estate-based debt products. There are 
both residential MBSs and commercial MBSs.”); Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay 
Conveyancers-Empirical Evidence Says “Cease Fire!”, 31 CONN. L. REV. 423, 491 (1999) (“The 
preceding regulatory agencies ultimately were unable to distinguish in their databases between 
complaints filed in residential real estate transactions and those filed in commercial real estate 
transactions.”). Similarly, “commercial speech” is widely used in contrast to “political speech” or 
“artistic speech.” Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 
1108 (1991) (“[R]ather than regarding commercial speech as simply less valued than political speech, 
the Relational Framework employs less content-specific factors to distinguish between categories of 
speech.”); Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities Regulation, 58 
S.C. L. REV. 789, 807 n.117 (2007) (“The rationale for the supposed constitutionality of such government 
restraint turns on notions of the difference between commercial speech and political or artistic speech or 
on some notions of regulation of professionals in the securities industry.”). 
 56. Fiona Smith & Lorna Woods, A Distinction Without a Difference: Exploring the Boundary 
Between Goods and Services in the World Trade Organization and the European Union, 12 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 1, 3 (2005) (“In many legal systems distinctions are made between ‘goods’ and ‘services’ with 
different regimes applying to each of them. Although in some instances goods and services may be 
subject to similar rules despite these distinct regimes, in other cases they may be accorded different 
treatment. Indeed, it may be that, given their inherent characteristics, goods and services should be 
treated differently.”); see also Walter White, Difference Between Goods and Services: Visual Guide, 
INEVITABLE STEPS, https://inevitablesteps.com/marketing/difference-between-goods-and-services/ (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2018) (referring to seven major differences between goods and services: intangibility, 
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governs sales of goods, but generally not sales of land, services, or intangibles—
has rules on risk of loss while goods are in possession of a carrier or other bailee,57 
as well as rules on the seller’s tender of goods and the buyer’s acceptance or 
rejection of those goods.58  None of these rules has a particularly close analog in 
sales of land, services, or intangibles.59 
Moreover, cross-border transactions in goods grew earlier in history,60 and 
(internationally, at least) remain larger than cross-border transactions in services,61 
so the case for uniform law across jurisdictions was stronger earlier with respect to 
transactions in goods than transactions in land, which cannot move across borders, 
                                                          
ownership, perishability, evaluation, quality measurement, simultaneous production and consumption, 
and punctuality). 
 57. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SALES LAW 287–316 (1st ed. 2009) 
(describing U.C.C. sections 2-509 and 2-510 as governing risk of loss). 
 58. See id. at 292 (describing U.C.C. sections 2-503 and 2-504 as governing seller’s tender of goods); 
id. at 481-95 (describing U.C.C. sections 2-601, 2-602, 2-612 as governing buyer’s rejection of goods); 
id. at 474-81 (describing U.C.C. sections 2-606 and 2-607 as governing buyer’s acceptance of goods); 
id. at 496-507 (describing U.C.C. sections 2-607, 2-608 as governing buyer’s right to revoke acceptance). 
 59. See DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (6th ed. 2016) (“In contrast to the sales of 
goods system, there is a true functional significance to the moment of the ‘closing’ in real estate sales. 
Following the closing, there is very little chance, absent some fundamental fraud or mistake in the 
transaction, that the buyer would be able to reject or revoke acceptance of the real estate and rescind the 
entire contract.”); 10 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES UCITA § 604:1 (NIMMER 2016) (referring to “a 
fundamental difference between transactions in the area of sales of goods and transactions in reference 
to information or information services. In the latter type of transaction, there are many situations in which 
the Article 2 concept of tender, inspection and delivery of a copy are simply irrelevant. Instead, the 
performance (e.g., grant or rights, completion of services, providing of access) in itself conveys to the 
transferee all of the value that it contracted for.”). Risk of loss while goods are in possession of a carrier 
or other bailee can have no close analog in transactions (land, services, intangibles) that have nothing 
physically moved to possession of a carrier or bailee. 
 60. See, e.g., Bamber Gascoigne, History of Trade, HIST. WORLD, http://www.historyworld.
net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=gpy#1923 (last visited Sep. 26, 2017) (during the first 
to fifth centuries AD, “[t]he caravan routes of the Middle East and the shipping lanes of the 
Mediterranean . . . provided the world’s oldest trading system, ferrying goods to and fro between 
civilizations from India to Phoenicia.”); TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, in WORLD TRADE REPORT 
2013 44, 54 (World Trade Organization, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr13-
2b_e.pdf. (explaining that from 1918 to 1939, trade “was largely dominated by the exchange of raw 
materials and agricultural products for manufactured goods . . . since 1945, the main component of trade 
has been the international exchange of manufactured goods or the components of manufactured goods”). 
In contrast, cross-border transactions in services are relatively recent. Raymond T. Nimmer, Services 
Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 736 (1993) 
(“Historically, services contracts involved intangible and nonstorable value. If I hire a company to repair 
my office air conditioning system, the services it provides are rendered on site and cannot be stored for 
later use. The service provider must be present . . . Many modern services contracts retain this 
nonstorable and localized character. But prior to the information, communications and transportation 
explosions of the past several decades, this was the only option for most commercial services.”). See 
also Prakash Loungani, Saurabh Mishra, Chris Papageorgiou & Ke Wang, World Trade in Services: 
Evidence from a New Dataset 16 (Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/17/77, 2017) (“[T]he 
global economy . . . for so long depended on the stable engines of manufacturing production and exports 
. . . The industrial revolution built the manufacturing process with the steam engine, division of labor, 
electricity and mass manufactured production.”); id. at 3-4 (“Historically, buyers and sellers needed to 
be face to face . . . Provision of services - such as restaurant meals, haircuts, and medical checkups -  
required face-to-face transactions. These did not lend themselves easily to standardization and trade”). 
 61. WORLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2015 1, 14–15 (2015) (showing that in 
2014 world merchandise (goods) exports totaled $19,002 while world exports of commercial services 
totaled $4,782) (“Global services trade, as measured by balance-of payments statistics, represents only 
about a fifth of total trade in goods and services combined.”); International Trade Statistics 2015, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its15_toc_e.htm (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
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or service transactions.62  In fact, uniform law—both within the United States and 
internationally—advanced earlier and farther with respect to transactions in goods 
than in land or services. Domestically, uniform law on goods dates back at least to 
the 1906 Uniform Sales Act63 and has been carried forward with the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which governs transactions in goods—including not only sales 
and leases of goods, but also goods as collateral, and as the subject of documents of 
title,64—while transactions in land and most services remain largely subject to non-
uniform state law.65   Internationally, while the Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods (governing contracts for the sale of goods) is ratified by eighty-seven 
nations,66 no analogous convention governs contracts for the international sale of 
services.67 
                                                          
 62. However, at least one commercial law scholar thought uniformity in the law governing services 
was worth pursuing as early as a quarter century ago. See Nimmer, supra note 60, at 729 (“It is time, 
actually long past time, to include services contracts in the UCC.”). When original Article 2 was written, 
most commercial services were provided locally. The world has changed. While many services are 
provided on a local basis, vast amounts of commercial services are supplied by national companies or 
by services vendors brought in from remote locations . . . [T]hrough information technology and 
communications systems, vendors can work from remote locations. If desired, the services output can 
usually be stored. Restraints in location and storability, like impediments on travel, no longer impede 
national services networks . . . Services contracts today involve a mix of nationally sourced and local 
transactions. In this respect, they resemble the mix found in transactions in goods. Id. at 736–37. 
 63. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the American Bar Association created the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to promote uniformity in law among the states. 
Richard L. Savage III, Laying the Ghost of Reliance to Rest in Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: An “Endpoints” Analysis, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1065, 1068–69 (1993). In 1902, the 
conference chose Professor Samuel Williston to lead a commercial acts project, eventually known as the 
Uniform Sales Act. Id. at 1069. The Uniform Sales Act was patterned after the British Sale of Goods 
Act of 1893 and in 1906 was promulgated for the states to adopt. See id. 
 64. U.C.C. Article 2-Sales (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); U.C.C. Article 2A-Leases 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); U.C.C. Article 7-Documents of Title (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); U.C.C. Article 9-Security Interests in Personal Property (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). Nimmer, supra note 60 (UCC’s scope “reflects a goods bias”). 
 65. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY, 192 (8th ed. 2016) (“The UCC does not govern the rendering of services or the sale of land. 
Contracts for selling services or land are governed by common law contracts principles…”); Nimmer, 
supra note 60, at 732 (“Services contract law consists of often obscure common-law principles and state-
by-state diversity.”); id. at 735 (“Consider what default rule governs whether delivery of a slightly 
damaged product breaches a contract for the sale of a television, and contrast this with the default rule 
that governs whether a brief delay in completing work breaches a consulting contract . . . For the 
television, UCC Article 2 provides the reference point, and the general rule will be the same in most 
states. The answer for the consulting contract lies in common-law rules. One might turn to the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts for a general principle, but the Restatement principles have not been 
adopted in all states; answers for particular states would depend on relevant case law . . . Both bodies of 
law can be discovered and applied, but codified rules are more readily accessible and tend to be more 
uniform across jurisdictions.”). 
 66. Internationally, the Convention on the International Sales of Goods was released in 1980 and has 
87 ratifying parties and 18 signatories, while no comparable treaty governs transactions in land or a wide 
array of services. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 11, 1980), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.a
spx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=en (status of CISG including dates, parties, 
and signatories); Franco Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application and 
Scholarly Writing, 15 J.L. & COM. 1, 65 n.432 (1995) (“The rationale behind the exclusion of the 
international sale of immoveable property from the sphere of application of the CISG is the potential 
refusal to ratify the CISG by most States which would not have accepted a uniform law derogating their 
domestic law in a field controlled by public policy considerations.”). 
 67. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited With The Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION (Mar. 2, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/pages/Content.aspx?path=DB/MTDSGStatus/p
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The commonality of uniform law and arbitration is that they both facilitate 
cross-border transactions, so uniform law and arbitration share a virtue more likely 
relevant to a transaction in goods than in land or services. One of the advantages of 
uniform law across jurisdictions is that it reduces disputes about which 
jurisdiction’s law governs.68  When law is non-uniform, each party to a dispute may 
argue for its own jurisdiction’s law, which is presumably more familiar, and perhaps 
more favorable, to that party.69  So uniform law can relieve a party of the costs of 
complying with the presumably less familiar and favorable law of the opposing 
party’s jurisdiction. 
Similarly, a neutral arbitral forum can relieve a party of the costs of litigating 
in the courts of the opposing party’s jurisdiction. In addition to fear of a court’s 
possible bias for its own fellow citizens litigating against foreigners, “the general 
fear associated with litigating before a foreign court... includes lack of familiarity 
with the foreign court’s system or procedure, pursuing the litigation away from 
home and the difficulties of enforcement of a foreign judgment.”70  These fears can 
be avoided with a neutral arbitral forum.71  So this advantage of arbitration, like the 
                                                          
ageIntro_en.xml (listing all multilateral treaties of the UN (including the CISG) none of which concern 
international contracts in services or land); Maria del Pillar Perales Viscasillas, UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts: Sphere of Application and General Provisions, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
& COMP. LAW 381, 385 (1996) (The CISG “is an international treaty which states may incorporate as 
national law,” while the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts for international 
service contracts are merely “a set of rules without binding character for either individuals or states.”). 
Similarly, treaties regarding tariffs and other trade barriers have progressed farther with respect to goods 
than services. The General Agreement on Trade in Services “is far less comprehensive and more 
discretionary than” the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which governs goods. Andreas Lindner, 
Bill Cave, Lydia Deloumeaux & Joscelyn Magdeleine, Trade in Goods and Services: Statistical Trends 
and Measurement Challenges, 7 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. STAT. BRIEF No. 1, 2001, 
https://www.oecd.org/trade/its/2539563.pdf. 
 68. Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 671, 671–72 (1999) 
(“[U]niform rules [in international commercial law] promote efficiency. Diverse national laws create 
legal costs of determining and complying with the laws of multiple jurisdictions. Ex post litigation costs 
of forum shopping and deciding sometimes difficult choice of law issues are also produced. 
Because uniform law subjects a transnational commercial transaction to a single set of rules, 
it reduces the legal costs associated with the transaction.”). 
 69. See Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 
34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 489 (2014) (“Lawyers are typically trained in the law of one legal system, 
and thus admitted (and insured) to practice one law. If their client eventually decides to provide for 
another law to govern her contract, only lawyers admitted to practice that other law will be able to advise 
her with respect to the particular transaction. In most cases, this will mean that only those lawyers will 
be able to make profit out of the relevant transaction. The result is that most lawyers have strong 
incentives to see their client provide for the law in which they are trained.”). See also Gilles Cuniberti, 
The Laws of Asian International Business Transactions, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 35, 61 (2016) (“Each 
[party] knows the contract law of his particular jurisdiction but typically does not know the law of other 
jurisdictions, including the law of the other party’s jurisdiction. Parties would, therefore, prefer to submit 
their contract to their own law not only to avoid the additional costs associated with learning a foreign 
law, but also because it is psychologically more comfortable to apply familiar law to their business 
relationships.”). 
 70. Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration- Corporate Attitudes and Practices- 12 Perceptions 
Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 525, 537-39 (2004). 
 71. See W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 2-3 (1995) (“In short, while speed, informality, and 
economy have had some influence on the growth of international commercial arbitration, the essential 
driving force has been the desire of each party to avoid having its case determined in a foreign judicial 
forum. Parties seek to avoid these forums for fear that they will be at a disadvantage due to 
unfamiliarity with the jurisdiction’s language and procedures, preferences of the judge, and possibly 
even national bias.”). 
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advantage of uniform law, is more significant with respect to transactions in goods, 
which are more likely to be cross-border, than transactions in land or services.  
Thus, we should not be surprised that Mentschikoff found that the organizations of 
parties who most often deal in goods—trade associations comprised of merchants 
and especially those whose business is international—created arbitration systems to 
resolve disputes among their members. As noted above, Mentschikoff found 
“institutionalized arbitration” more common among trade associations: (1) 
comprised of merchants (those buying for resale), (2) associations engaged in 
foreign trade, and (3) dealing in raw/fungible goods; and she found that when all 
three factors—merchants (buy for resale), international trade, and raw goods—are 
present, the rate of institutionalized arbitration approaches 100%.72 
III. PRIVATE ORDERING IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
Mentschikoff uses her phrase “institutionalized arbitration” to include two 
types of commercial arbitration: (1) arbitration administered by a trade association, 
and (2) arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). 
Commercial Arbitration’s detailed study of these two types of arbitration reveals 
their contrasts and thus illuminates different types of private ordering. 
“Self-contained trade group arbitration is,” Mentschikoff concludes, “an 
extremely important method of settling buyer-seller disputes.”73 However, she 
explains, lawyers are generally not involved in trade association arbitration, because 
merchants play all the necessary roles. Lawyers typically neither represent the 
parties in trade association arbitration nor serve as arbitrators.74  Moreover, the 
parties to trade association arbitration agreements rarely need litigation to enforce 
such agreements or to confirm or vacate trade association arbitration awards. 
Mentschikoff notes that merchant parties to trade association arbitration agreements 
rarely need courts to enforce such arbitration agreements and awards because these 
merchants are repeat players in the same industry and thus are vulnerable to non-
legal pressures—culminating in expulsion from the trade association—if they 
challenge the arbitration agreement or award.75 
                                                          
 72. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 852. 
 73. Id. at 854. 
 74. Id. at 859 (“In almost all self-contained trade associations and exchanges, on the other hand, 
lawyer participation in the arbitration proceedings is either forbidden or discouraged, and very few of 
the arbitrators are lawyers or law-trained.”). This remains true in soft commodities arbitration (SCA) 
such as that administered by the Grain and Feed Trade Association and the Federation of Oils, Seeds 
and Fats Associations. See Chernykh, supra note 29 (“Limiting the role of lawyers is an important 
common feature in SCA; lawyers are not usually included in the mandatory arbitral panel and cannot as 
a rule represent parties in oral hearings without both parties’ express agreement, which in practice is 
seldom given.”). 
 75. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 854 (“In exchange groups, not only is resort to arbitration on the 
whole compulsory for members, but failure to abide by an award is frequently considered grounds for 
disciplinary proceedings against the recalcitrant party.”). See also Mentschikoff, supra note 42, at 703–
04 (“The point to be made in favor of arbitration is that typically such legal testing or appeal is not 
indulged in by the parties. There are non-legal pressures to accept the process and the award . . . In the 
labor field . . . [t]he economic sanction of strike or lockout is always present to enforce good faith action 
under an arbitration clause. In the commercial field . . . [i]t may be that the third attribute of arbitration 
with all that it connotes for the criteria of decision is enough to swing the balance in favor of arbitration: 
A judge whom you can choose for yourself”); Charny, supra note 21, at 409 (“[I]n a well-organized 
market with an institutional apparatus for dispute resolution, such as an arbitration system, nonlegal 
sanctions are used to enforce compliance with the arbitrators’ decisions.”); id. at 400 (“A trade 
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In contrast, Mentschikoff shows, the AAA’s general commercial arbitration—
often involving parties not in the same trade association—tends to be very 
different.76  This general commercial arbitration is much more like litigation, with 
lawyers usually representing the parties and often serving as arbitrators.77  
Moreover, Mentschikoff emphasizes that central to the AAA’s mission is producing 
arbitration awards courts will confirm rather than vacate.78  She describes AAA 
procedures including a clerk whose job is to draft the award and prevent the 
arbitrators from writing a reasoned opinion, because the AAA believes a very short 
award—with no reasoning that could tempt a court to find flaws—is less likely to 
be vacated.79  Relatedly, because the AAA is more concerned than trade 
associations about how an arbitration’s process will appear to a reviewing court, the 
AAA is more concerned about arbitration procedure, thus further “lawyer-izing” 
AAA arbitration compared to trade association arbitration.80 
While AAA procedures have changed since Mentschikoff’s day, short awards 
remain common in much domestic commercial arbitration, in part because the AAA 
encourages them.81  However, while short awards may deter vacatur, they lack the 
                                                          
association or industry arbitration system may also enforce standards by exacting penalties from 
members, expelling noncompliant members, or certifying superior products with its ‘seal of approval.’”); 
Richman, supra note 8, at 2339 (Since failure to comply with industry rules and arbitrators’ rulings 
“precludes future business in the industry, losers of arbitration rulings will exhibit compliance only if 
the benefits from their future dealings within the merchant community will outweigh their immediate 
loss in arbitration.”); id. at 2340 (“A merchant who is found by a private court to have breached a contract 
but fails to pay receives publicity as a bad actor, leading other merchants to respond to the public ruling 
by refusing to deal with the transgressor. The literature is replete with instances of such coordinated and 
collectively orchestrated punishments.”). 
 76. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 857–58. 
 77. Id. at 859 (“Lawyers represent one or more of the parties in 80 per cent of the cases, and serve as 
arbitrators in about 30 per cent. The availability of legal norms or standards for utilization in the 
disposition of particular arbitrations at the Association is therefore theoretically present.”). 
 78. Id. at 856 (The AAA “from its beginning held itself out as an expert in matters that went to the 
enforceability of an award and set up its rules and regulations with the primary aim of rendering awards 
that would not be set aside by the courts.”). 
 79. Id. at 865 (“After the hearings are declared closed, the arbitrators, possibly on the same day, meet 
to reach a decision. Briefs are sometimes requested, but this is not the usual practice. The tribunal clerk, 
who has sat through the hearings and who frequently is consulted by the arbitrators as to appropriate 
procedure, sometimes sits with the arbitrators during deliberations, but more commonly, he is simply 
available to answer questions. His major task at this point is to draft the award in a legally perfect manner 
and to prevent the arbitrators from issuing an opinion.”); id. at 857 (“The Association puts enormous 
pressure on its arbitrators not to write opinions but to merely state the award in dollar amounts.”). 
 80. Id. at 858 (“The third difference between self-contained trade association systems and the casual 
arbitration at the Association lies in the methods by which awards are enforced. The ultimate sanction 
in many of the self-contained associations and in almost all of the exchanges is a disciplinary proceeding 
and thus, potential legal problems with respect to procedure are not seriously considered in these groups. 
The ultimate sanction at the Association is the rendering of judgment on the award by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, and therefore problems of procedure are always uppermost in the minds of the 
tribunal clerks, who are charged with the duty of policing the arbitrators sufficiently, so that the award 
rendered will be legally enforceable.”). 
 81. See Cynthia A. Murray, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 637-38 (2002) (“[M]ost awards 
in domestic commercial arbitration do not specify the factual and/or legal grounds on which they are 
based”); Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 449, 513 (2005) (“[A]n arbitrator’s freedom from the need to explain or justify his award is closely 
linked to his lack of accountability in terms of judicial review: The naked award that is the norm in 
domestic commercial arbitrations can be explained as much by a desire to insulate decisions from judicial 
scrutiny as to any desire to avoid the delay or added expense that written opinions would entail.”); 
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reasoning of a good precedent that can be relied upon in future cases. This fits 
Mentschikoff’s observation that AAA arbitrators’ decisions are rarely used as 
precedents while, in contrast, trade association arbitrators’ decisions often have 
precedential value.82  Trade associations, she writes, maintain continuity in their 
arbitrators and circulate their opinions to members or allow for some form of 
appeal.83 
Commercial Arbitration’s discussion of arbitration awards includes one of 
Mentschikoff’s most cited passages, which is her finding that “[e]ighty percent of 
the experimental arbitrators thought that they ought to reach their decisions within 
the context of the principles of substantive rules of law, but almost 90 percent 
believed that they were free to ignore these rules whenever they thought that more 
just decisions would be reached by so doing.”84  Mentschikoff’s finding that most 
arbitrators feel free to ignore substantive rules of law highlights the degree to which 
arbitration can privatize lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, Mentschikoff’s Commercial Arbitration continues to teach us about 
commercial arbitration in ways that teach us also about commerce and about the 
private production, application, and enforcement of law. She details a 
thoroughgoing form of private ordering in trade association arbitration that 
privatizes all three of: 
(1) lawmaking (through arbitrators applying industry trade rules rather than 
governmental law, and through the precedential effect of arbitrators’ reasoned 
awards); 
                                                          
THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 626 (5th ed. 2016) (“Written opinions are a rarity, except in labor 
arbitration, maritime and international arbitration. Indeed, the AAA urges arbitrators to avoid writing 
opinions as a means to keep the arbitral participants form challenging awards.”); Abraham J. Gafni, 
Written Opinions in Arbitration Aren’t a Given, LAW.COM (Sept. 22, 2008), 
https://www.law.com/almID/1202424702244. (“[I]n the AAA Commercial Rules and the Uniform 
Arbitration Act, there is a presumption that a reasoned opinion will not be issued unless the parties so 
require”). 
 82. Mentschkoff, supra note 9, at 857 (“Arbitration at the Association differs substantially from 
arbitration at the self-contained trade groups. The first and most significant difference between the two 
systems lies in the use of precedent. The decisions that are rendered by the arbitration committees of 
self-contained trade associations do have precedential value. This is achieved in two ways: in some 
associations opinions are written and circulated to the membership; in others awards can be appealed or 
referred to other committees for the establishment of general standards. Most important, however, in all 
of these associations there is a continuity in the membership of the deciders, which means that the system 
of precedent operates automatically, for a question decided in one case on the basis of consideration of 
competing norms is unlikely to be decided differently in the next case by the same people. However, the 
casual system of arbitration used by the American Arbitration Association, is designed to discourage the 
use of precedent. The Association puts enormous pressure on its arbitrators not to write opinions but to 
merely state the award in dollar amounts. It also tries very hard and very successfully not to have any 
one person sit as an arbitrator more than once or twice a year.”). 
 83. Id. For more on the precedential value of arbitration awards, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, 
Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2012). 
 84. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 861. A separate question is how often arbitrators in fact ignore or 
depart from the substantive law a court would have applied had the case been litigated. See Christopher 
R.  Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 194 (2006) (“‘[H]ow often’ do 
arbitrators not follow the law? The empirical evidence on this point--which consists of case analyses, 
surveys of arbitrators, and reversal rates of arbitration awards and court decisions-- is varied but 
ultimately inconclusive.” (footnote omitted)). 
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(2) adjudication (through arbitration procedures quite different from courts’ 
rules of procedure and evidence); and 
(3) enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision (through private sanctions 
culminating in expulsion from the association). 
By contrast, she shows that the general commercial arbitration typical of the 
AAA often includes only the second of these three forms of privatization. 
Mentschikoff’s comparison of two types of commercial arbitration thus leads us 
from the mundane context of ordinary sales disputes to fundamental questions about 
the roles of private parties in the production, application, and enforcement of law. 
In these important ways, she established both the path followed by significant 
portions of today’s private ordering literature, exemplified by Drahozal and 
Richman,85 and the path of in-depth empirical study exemplified by Bernstein.86  In 
short, Commercial Arbitration’s relevance endures. 
                                                          
 85. See Richman, supra note 4. 
 86. See Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 29. 
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